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We demonstrate that analysts revise their forecasts of net operating income downward following 
the announcement of an equity-for-debt swap. Their revisions are positively correlated with the 
size of the stock-price reaction to the swap announcement. This evidence supports the hypothe- 
sis that announcements of equity-for-debt swaps convey information about the expected level of 
cash flows of the firm. We also provide evidence that this information is about transitory changes 
in the expected cash Rows. 
1. Introduction 
Recent studies document significant negative stock-price reactions to an- 
nouncements of leverage-decreasing transactions.’ This paper examines 
whether some portion of the stock-price drop might be explained by the 
cash-flow information hypothesis. This hypothesis postulates that the an- 
nouncement of a decrease in leverage conveys negative information about the 
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debt swaps. We thank Sanjai Bhagat, Tom Lys, Richard Ruback (the editor), Paul Healv (the 
referee), and the finance seminars at the University of California/Davis, the University of 
Colorado/Boulder. and the University of Virginia/Darden for helpful suggestions. 
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(1985). Eckbo (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Bruner (1986), 
Ofer and Natarajan (1987), Lys and Sivaramakrishnan (1988), and Hand (19891. 
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firm’s cash flo~.s.~*~ Using a sample of equity-for-debt swaps.’ in which firms 
issue new equity and use the proceeds to retire debt, we find evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis, 
We test the cash-flow information hypothesis by examining updates in 
analyst forecasts of cash flows around announcements of equity-for-debt 
swaps. If these announcements convey information about expected cash 
flows, analysts will update their cash-flow forecasts. If, as implied by the 
efficient-markets hypothesis, abnormal returns around swap announcements 
capture the value of the information released by the announcement, there 
should be a positive correlation between updates in analysts’ cash-flow 
forecasts and the stock-price reaction; larger decreases in stock price should 
be associated with larger downward revisions in cash-flow forecasts. We find 
such a positive correlation. 
This study is related to two previous studies: Ofer and Siegel (1987) and 
Lys and Sivaramakrishnan (1988). Our study is similar to Ofer and Siegel’s, 
which documents a positive correlation between analysts’ forecast errors for 
earnings-per-share forecasts made before dividend announcements and the 
price change surrounding those announcements.j”j The use of forecasts of 
earnings per share to examine the information content of announcements of 
equity-for-debt swaps is not appropriate, however, because the pure mechan- 
ics of the swap change expected earnings per share. For example, in a 
Modigliani-Miller (1958) world, a swap of equity for debt will leave the stock 
price unchanged, but will decrease the cost of equity and the expected 
‘For example. Ross (1977) suggests that the firm’s choice of capital structure may signal 
managers’ private information about cash flows. In this type of signaling equilibrium, managers 
receiving bad news do not want to signal this information to the market, but are forced to do so 
because it is too expensive to mimic those not receiving bad news. 
‘Other hypotheses have been offered to explain the stock-price reactions to leverage-decreas- 
ing event announcements [see Hand (198911. First, imperfect managerial contracting can create a 
divergence between the interests of managers and stockholders [see Defeo, Lambert, and Larker 
(1989)]. Thus, managers may decrease leverage to manipulate reported earnings and increase 
current compensation, even though this can cause a loss of tax shields for the firm and reduce 
firm value. Second, there may have been an increase in the risk of the underlying assets of the 
firm, which was not previously known to the capital markets. As a result, the optimal capital 
structure of the firm contains less debt and the announced reduction in leverage conveys this 
increase in risk to the market, causing a drop in stock price. These explanations and the 
cash-flow information hypothesis are not mutually exclusive. 
‘Several other papers have examined equity-for-debt swaps. Finnerty (1985) and Rogers and 
Owers (1985) report significant abnormal returns around announcements of these swaps. Hand 
(1989) attempts to identify motivations for swaps. Using a variety of tests, he finds evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms use swaps to smooth earrungs. Another paper, Lys and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1988). we discuss later. 
50fer and Siegel (1987) use forecast errors instead of revisions in forecasts for reasons related 
to the construction of the consensus forecasts used in their study. 
60ther studies that examine changes in earnings or changes in earnings expectations following 
changes in corporate financial policy include Ofer and Natarajan (1987), Jain (1988). Healy and 
Palepu (1988, 1989). and Dan”, Masulis, and Mayers (1989). 
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earnings per share. Moreover, a loss of tax shields associated with the swap 
can cause a further drop in expected earnings per share. Thus, even if no 
information is conveyed by the swap announcement, we would expect ana- 
lysts to lower their forecasts of earnings per share. These effects would 
probably lead to a spurious correlation between revisions in analysts’ earn- 
ings-per-share forecasts and the negative stock-price movements around the 
swap announcement. 
Lys and Sivaramakrishnan (1988) examine the relation between changes in 
earnings per share (adjusted for changes in the number of shares outstand- 
ing) and changes in stock prices around swap announcements. As with 
earnings per share, their measure of adjusted earnings per share is affected 
by the mechanics of the swap. The reduction in after-tax interest brought 
about by the swap causes an increase in their adjusted earnings per share 
relative to earnings per share before the swap.’ This increase can offset any 
drop in expected earnings per share due to bad news released by the swap 
announcement or to the pure mechanics of the swap. (This may explain why 
Lys and Sivaramakrishnan find that swapping firms on average show better 
performance after the swap, when compared with a group of industry 
competitors.) Thus, the overall effect of the swap announcement on forecast 
revisions (or forecast errors) for adjusted earnings and on the correlation 
between forecast revisions (or forecast errors) and the change in price sur- 
rounding the swap announcement is ambiguous. Lys and Sivaramakrishnan 
document a positive relation between forecast errors based on a time-series 
model of past realized earnings per share and the change in stock price 
surrounding swap announcements. They are unable. however, to find a 
significant relation between revisions in analysts’ forecasts of adjusted earn- 
ings and the change in stock price. 
In this study, we use analysts’ forecasts of net operating income of the firm 
as a proxy for market expectations of firm cash flows. Unlike earnings per 
share, net operating income measures cash flows before interest and taxes 
are removed, and is not affected by the change in the number of shares 
outstanding. Thus, the pure mechanics of the swap will not affect net 
operating income. Any revisions in forecasts of net operating income associ- 
ated with the swap announcement should reflect only changes in analysts’ 
expectations of operating cash flows of the firm. Therefore, analysis of such 
‘Let Nb, Ib, and EPS, denote the number of shares, interest payments, and expected earnings 
per share before the swap. Let N,, I,, and EPS, be the analogous quantities after the swap. Let 
EBfT denote expected earnings before interest and taxes and t fhe tax rate. EPS,, U’S,, and 
EBIT represent expectations for the fiscal year that includes the swap. Finally, suppose that 
expectations about EBfT are not affected by the swap announcemenf. Then EPS, = [(EBIT - 
1,X1 - t)]/Nb and EPS, = [(EBrT- [,X1 - t)]/N,. Lys and Sivaramakrishnan (1988) define 
adjusted earnings per share as Ef5; = EPS,(N,/N,) = [( EBlT - IOX1 - t)]/N,. Subtracting the 
EPS before the swap from the adjusted EPS after the swap yields [( Ib - IOX1 - t)]/N,. This is 
positive, because the swap reduces interest payments. 
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revisions allows us to test directly whether some portion of the negative 
stock-price reactions associated with swap announcements is due to adverse 
information about expected cash flows. 
Using net operating income as a measure of cash flow, we are able to 
document a significant relation between revisions in analysts’ forecasts and 
changes in stock price surrounding swap announcements. Theories proposing 
that swap announcements convey information about firm cash flows imply 
that stock-price reactions to these announcements come as a result of market 
participants updating their expectations of cash flows. Because analysts’ 
forecasts are perhaps the closest measure of market expectations available, 
our results provide strong and direct evidence consistent with the hypothesis 
that market participants update their cash-flow expectations following swap 
announcements. Using both short- and long-term forecasts of cash flows, we 
provide evidence that the information conveyed by swap announcements is 
about transitory changes in expected cash flows. Finally, we show that a 
significant relation between revisions in analysts’ forecasts and changes in 
stock price is present only in the latter part of our sample period. Since 
equity-for-debt swaps were an innovation, this could be evidence that the 
financial analysts we study did not at first recognize the information content 
of swaps, but learned after observing them over time. 
Section 2 develops a model of the relation between revisions in expecta- 
tions about net operating income and changes in stock price associated with 
the announcement of a swap. Section 3 uses this model to develop the 
equations we use to test our hypotheses and discusses the econometric issues 
surrounding the estimation of these equations. Section 4 discusses the data 
and presents the test results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
To test whether announcements of equity-for-debt swaps convey informa- 
tion about firm cash flows, we construct a model characterizing the changes 
in share price that would result from changes in the expected level of net 
operating income conveyed by swap announcements. We consider both 
permanent and transitory changes in net operating income.8 This model 
enables us to place restrictions on the parameters we estimate and to 
evaluate our specification. 
We define the relation between NOI’, the market’s expectation of net 
operating income for the entire firm, and EPS’, the market’s expectation of 
“Lys and Sivaramakrishnan (1988) also address the distinction between permanent and 
transitory changes in cash flows. 
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earnings per share, by 
EPS’ = SNOY, (1) 
where the parameter S is a firm-specific multiplier. 
Eq. (1) is an identity, with 6 incorporating the number of shares outstand- 
ing, interest payments, taxes, and tax shields of the firm. Thus EPS’ repre- 
sents that portion of expected net operating income per share that goes to 
equity holders. 
We assume that the price of the firm’s stock (P> is 
P = EPSF/d = 6NOIe/d, (2) 
where n is a firm-specific capitalization factor that equals the difference 
between the required rate of return on the firm’s equity and the expected 
growth rate in earnings per share. 
2.1. Permanent change in NOI’ 
Suppose that any information the swap announcement releases about 
expected net operating income concerns a permanent change. Taking the 
total differential of the price in (2), the change in the share price resulting 
from the announcement is 
(3) 
where JNOI’, 46, and 4d are the changes in the market’s values for the 
respective parameters due to the swap announcement. Eq. (3) explicitly 
models the change in price associated with the announcement as a function 
of changes not only in the expected level of net operating income, but also in 
risk and growth rates (through 4d), and in the number of shares, tax shields, 
and the debt-equity ratio (through 48). 
Dividing (3) by P and substituting from (21, eq. (3) becomes 
(4) 
Eq. (4) shows how the ,different aspects of a swap can cause a change in the 
stock price. The first term represents a pure information effect about the 
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expected level of net operating income. All else being equal, if the market’s 
expectation of NOI changes by a given percentage, the per-share price of the 
firm changes by the same percentage. The next two terms have more complex 
interpretations. The pure mechanics of the swap increase the number of 
shares outstanding (decreasing 6), reduce interest payments (increasing 8). 
reduce the risk of equity (decreasin g d), and possibly reduce tax shields 
(decreasing 6). 
To see the impact of the changes, suppose first that we are in a pure 
Modigliani-Miller (1958) world and that no information is released by the 
swap (i.e., ANOI’ = 0). Modigliani-Miller Proposition I implies that the 
swap will not change the stock price and therefore the second and third 
terms must cancel. Thus, any changes in n and 6 caused by the pure 
mechanics of the swap will offset each other. Other effects on S and A may 
affect the stock price, as demonstrated by (4). For example, any information 
about the change in firm risk or rate of income growth released by the swap 
induces a negative correlation between Ad/d and LIP/P. Similarly, any 
unexpected change in tax shields resulting from the swap induces a positive 
correlation between A6/S and _1P/P. The correlations between &Y/6, 
Jd/d, and AP/P affect our estimating equations, as we discuss later. 
2.2 Trmsitory charge in NOI’ 
Suppose that any information the swap announcement releases about the 
net operating income concerns only a transitory change, i.e., a change in next 
period’s NOI’ only. We take the total differential of (2) with respect to 
changes in S and d, while allowing for only a transitory change in NOI’. 
Thus, the change in share price resulting from the announcement is 
(5) 
Dividing (5) by P and substituting from (2), eq. (5) becomes 
Eq. (6) specifies the relation between the relative change in price and the 
relative change in expected net operating income when the change in 
expected net operating income is transitory. The equation is very similar to 
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(4) for permanent changes, because that equation arose from a constant- 
growth perpetuity model. Thus, knowing next period’s earnings (and the 
discount factor) is sufficient for determining the equity value. The only 
difference is the coefficient on J NOIe/NOlr. This difference arises because 
a dollar increase in transitory income is worth only d as much as a dollar 
increase in permanent income. 
3. Econometric specification 
We use (4) and (6) to develop a test of whether announcements of 
equity-for-debt swaps convey information about expected levels of net operat- 
ing income. First, we describe the proxies we use to measure the relative 
change in stock price, APp/P, and the relative change in expected net 
operating income, ANOI’/NOI’, induced by the swap. We then discuss the 
implications of using these proxies in our estimation. 
3.1. Pro.yv variables 
Our proxy variables are measured along the following time line: 





0 = date of the swap announcement, 
tb = date of the market’s last forecast of net operating income before the 
swap announcement, 
ta = date of the market’s first forecast of net operating income after the 
swap announcement, 
t(j) = date j days from the swap announcement [for example, d-22) is the 
date two days before the swap announcement], 
T = end of the fiscal year. 
3.1.1. Relative change in price 
As a proxy for the price change due to the swap announcement, we use the 
change in price from the close of trading two days before the swap announce- 
ment to the close of trading one day after the announcement. We then divide 
this price change by the price two days before the announcement. We use a 
three-day window to accommodate both leakage of information before the 
announcement and uncertainty about the announcement date. 
This proxy for the relative price change may be error-ridden. Even though 
we remove observations for which there is a confounding event in the 
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announcement window, there may be information other than the swap 
announcement that can change the stock price during this window. Thus, we 
denote our proxy for the relative change in P as 
where PR[ .I refers to ‘proxy’ and 7, is the component of the relative change 
in price due to events other than the swap announcement. By construction, 
qp is independent of LIP/P. 
3.1.2. Relative change in expected net operating income 
As a proxy for the market’s expectation of net operating income, we use 
data from Value Line to construct a forecast. We discuss details of the Value 
Line data and the construction of the forecast below. We take the Value 
Line forecasts at dates tb and ta to be the market’s expectations of net 
operating income before and after the swap announcement. The time be- 
tween tb and ta is at least three months.’ Therefore, our proxy for 
4NOI’/NOt’ is error-ridden, because it includes updates in the Value Line 
forecast due to events other than the swap announcement during this 
three-month (or longer) period. We denote our proxy for the relative change 
in NOI’ as 
PR[G] = [G] +qn, (8) 
where T,, is the component of the relative change in the forecast of net 
operating income due to events other than the swap announcement. By 
construction, q,, is independent of 4NOI’/NOZ”. Further, because we have 
defined 4 P/P as the change in stock price due only to the swap announce- 
ment, 77, is independent of dP/P. 
3.2. Testing for information content 
Eq. (4) and (6) indicate that, if swap announcements convey information 
about the expected level of net operating income, there will be a positive 
correlation between 4 P/P and 4NOI’/NOI’. We cannot observe 4P/P 
and 4NOIe/NOIe directly, however, and therefore use the proxies discussed 
above. To examine whether swap announcements convey information about 
“We use quarterly forecast data. If the swap-announcement date is too close to the forecast- 
announcement date, however, we increase the time between rb and ta to six months. 
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expected net operating income, we test for a positive correlation between 
these proxies. For this test to have any meaning, however, we need to show 
that there is no correlation between the proxies if there is no information. To 




We use ANOI’/NOI’ as a left-hand-side variable because the measure- 
ment error will be larger for our proxy of this variable than for our proxy of 
AP/P.” This is true because the change in the forecast of net operating 
income we use occurs over at least a three-month period, whereas the change 
in stock price occurs over a three-day period. 
3.3. Estimating equations 
If information about the expected level of NOI is conveyed by the swap 
announcement, ANOI’/NOIe # 0. We can substitute the expressions for 





p=1 if permanent change in NOIe, 
= l/d if transitory change in NOIr. 
If no information about the expected level of NOI is conveyed by the swap 
announcement, ANOI’/NOI’ = 0. In this case, the drop in stock price 
observed after a swap announcement is due either to a perceived increase in 
risk, a drop in the rate of growth of NOIe, or a loss of tax shields. Then, from 
“We choose to place the variable with the largest error component on the left-hand side, 
because error in the left-hand-side variable will not bias OLS estimates. 
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(4’) and (67, F = &f/d - -16/A = -AP/P. Using (7) and substituting this 
expression for p, eq. (9) becomes 
Thus. if we write 
PR[G] =a+,,[:] +E, 
(9’) 
(10) 
then, because in the no-information case PR[AP/Pl does not appear on the 
right-hand side of eq. (97, 
/3 = 0 if no information is conveyed about the level of NOI’, 
> 0 if information is conveyed about the level of NOI’. 
The resulting coefficient estimates for (10) represent averages for the 
sample. 
We can now use (10) to construct a test of whether swap announcements 
contain information about expected levels of NOI, by examining whether 
p = 0.” First, however, we need to show that our construction of proxy 
variables will not lead to a spurious positive correlation between the proxies 
under the no-information hypothesis, and thus a spurious positive estimate 
for p. Second, even if we show that the first issue is not a problem, we need 
to understand the properties of the point estimate of p that we obtain and 
the properties of our test for p = 0. 
3.4. Control regression to test for spurious correlation 
Suppose there is no information in the swap announcement about the level 
of NOIr, so that (9’) holds. Then, in estimating (lo), we will find that /3 = 0 
as long as 7, and PR[A P/P] = A P/P + i, are independent. As discussed 
above, n,, and AP/P are independent by construction. Thus, we need to 
examine the correlation between the two errors n,, and vP. A positive 
correlation will induce a spurious positive correlation between PR[AP/P] 
and PR[A NOI’/NOI’]. These two error terms represent the relative changes 
in price and expected net operating income that are not associated with the 
swap announcement. To the extent that non-swap-related news in the three- 
day window surrounding the swap announcement affects both NOI’ and 
price, there may be a positive correlation between 7, and qP. This will 
induce a spurious positive regression coefficient. To test for such a spurious 
correlation, we run a control regression: 
ANOt' 
PR - 
[ 1 NOI’ (11) 
where subscript c refers to the control window from dates r(+2) through 
t( + 5). News that arrives in this window should be representative of the kind 
of non-swap-related news that might occur during the window t(-22) through 
t(+ 1). Theoretically, we would expect a positive coefficient from this regres- 
sion, because any news that arrives in the three-day control window that 
affects the market’s forecast of net operating income should also affect the 
stock price in the same direction. If there is no major event in the control 
window, however, we would expect this effect to be weak empirically, because 
the price change is measured over a three-day window. whereas the forecast 
change is measured over at least three months. By running this control 
regression, we can determine whether the correlation between qp and q,, is 
strong enough to affect our results. A positive and significant coefficient from 
this regression indicates that news other than that associated with the 
swap will induce spurious positive correlation between PR[APp/P] and 
PR[ A NO/‘/NOI’]. A nonsignificant coefficient indicates that spurious corre- 
lation is not likely to be a problem. If the control experiment shows no 
spurious correlation, then under the no-information hypothesis. we should 
obtain a coefficient of zero from estimating (10). 
3.5. Properties of OLS 
We now examine the properties of ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimates 
of (lo), assuming that 7, and ‘lP are independent. The control experiment 
discussed in the previous section allows us to test the validity of this 
independence assumption. 
From (9) the error term in that equation is 
E=Pk-_pl+71,. (12) 
This error term will be negatively correlated with the right-hand-side variable 
in (lo), PR[AP/P], for two reasons. First, qP and PR[-IP/P] are positively 
correlated from (7). This is the classic errors-in-variables problem. Second, 
from (4) and (6), w = Ad/d - A6/6 will be negatively correlated with 2. P/P, 
and therefore negatively correlated with PR[_l P/P]. Thus, OLS estimates of 
/? will be biased toward zero. Because the portion of the error term that is 
correlated with PR[AP/P] is multiplied by the slope p, however, there will 
360 R. Israel er al.. Cash-flow information in equry-for-debt swrps 
be no biases in OLS estimates under the null hypothesis that p = 0. Israel, 
Ofer, and Siegel (1990) have shown that in this case rejections of the null 
using standard significance tests are still valid, but the power of the tests may 
be low. Thus although we can test the no-information hypothesis, we must 
take care in interpreting the coefficient point estimates. 
4. Empirical tests 
4. I. Data and sample selection 
Our data set consists of a sample of equity-for-debt swaps. The original list 
of firms and swap characteristics was given to us by John Hand. The sample 
includes 247 swaps from September 23, 1981 through June 27, 1984. 
4.1.1. Swap-announcement dates 
The swap-announcement date is defined, as in Hand (1989), as the date the 
common stock is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Hand reports that these registrations are typically accompanied by a 
press release that goes out over the Dow Jones broad tape during trading 
hours. Some of these press releases are made after trading hours. Thus, we 
extend the announcement window through date t(+ 1). 
4.1.2. Stock-price data 
For each firm in the sample, we attempted to obtain stock-price data from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. We eliminated one 
swap because we could not match the firm with the CRSP data. 
4.1.3. Net operating income forecasts 
For each firm, we attempted to obtain forecasts of annual sales and 
operating margin from Value Line for the fiscal year in which the swap 
occurred. Value Line defines the operating margin as the percentage of sales 
being converted into income from operations.‘* It defines operating income 
as income before depreciation charges, interest expenses, income taxes, and 
extraordinary items. We define the Value Line forecast of net operating 
income as 
Forecast of NOI = (Forecast operating margin) x (Forecast sales). 
“See Bernhard (1987) for a description of the Value Line data. 
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We define rb as the date of the last forecast before the swap-announce- 
ment date, unless the forecast release and the swap announcement occur 
within two days of each other. In that case, we use the previous forecast- 
release date. Similarly, we define ru as the date of the first forecast release 
after the swap announcement, unless it follows the announcement by less 
than ten days. In that case, we use the subsequent forecast-announcement 
date. In all cases, we include only firms for which the forecasts are for the 
same fiscal year and for which that fiscal year ended after the swap an- 
nouncement. We eliminate 64 swaps for which we can not find CRSP and 
Value Line data. All of the forecasts of net operating income are nonnega- 
tive. 
4.1.4. Confounding events 
After matching our original sample with CRSP and Value Line data, we 
are left with 182 swaps. I3 We then use the Wall Street Journal Index to locate 
swaps for which a confounding event is reported between two days before 
and five days after the swap-announcement date. We chose this window to 
encompass both the announcement and control windows. Finally, we read the 
announcement of each swap in the Wall Street Journal to make sure that no 
other relevant news is reported simultaneously. This leaves us with a clean 
sample of 125 swaps. 
4.2. Descripti1.e statistics 
Table 1 presents characteristics of the swaps for the full sample. Table 2 
presents statistics for the variables used in the analysis for the full (panel A) 
and clean (panel B) samples. For both samples, there is a significant decline 
in share price within the announcement window, but no apparent change in 
price in the control window. These results ate similar to those reported in 
studies of leverage-decreasing transactions cited earlier. There is also a 
significant drop in forecast net operating income. This drop, by itself, is not 
sufficient evidence that negative information about expected net operating 
income is being conveyed by a swap. Fried and Givoly (1982) and Elton, 
Gruber, and Gultekin (1984) have documented that there are secular down- 
ward revisions in forecasts of income over time. Thus we test for a positive 
relation between the size of the stock-price movement around the announce- 
ment and the revision in the forecast of net operating income. 
“We also eliminate one data point that is clearlv an outlier. Using regression diagnostics from 
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980), we find that this one observation has an influence on the 
standard error of the slope estimate well outside the acceptable range. Upon investigation, we 
find that the number printed on the microfiche is not clearly readable. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for a sample of 182 equity-for-debt swaps. The sample period extends from 
September 23. 1981 through June 27. 1984. 
Variable 
Announcement date 
Swap size” (millions) 
Total face value of debt 
swapped (millions) 
Swap size as a percentage 
of firm sizeh 
Shares swapped as a 


























“Swap size equals the number of shares swapped times the price received by the investment 
bank. plus the cash paid. 
‘Firm size equals market value of equity plus book value of long-term debt. 
4.3. Regression results 
Table 3 presents results for the estimation of the main eq. (10) for both the 
full and clean samples, as well as results from the estimation of the control 
eq. (11) for both samples. The slope estimates for (10) are given in regres- 
sions I and II. They are 0.6503 for the full sample and 1.0370 for the clean 
sample. Whereas the one-tailed P-value of the slope estimate for the full 
sample is 0.0592, it is equal to 0.6131 for the clean sample. Both results are 
inconsistent with the no-information hypothesis.” Further, it is clear from 
the control regressions III and IV that spurious positive correlation between 
PR[dP/P] and PR[dNOI’/NOI”] is not likely to be a problem.15 The slope 
estimates for both the full and clean samples are insignificant. The P-values 
for the slope estimates are 0.7627 and 0.2672 for the full and clean samples. 
The results in regressions I through IV indicate that analysts’ revisions of 
NOI forecasts and the change in stock price surrounding a swap announce- 
ment are positively correlated. Such a positive correlation is inconsistent with 
“Instead of regressing the percentage change in forecast on the percentage change in price, 
Lys and Sivaramakrishnan (1988) regress the change in forecast divided by price on the 
percentage change in price. With their regression, the predicted value of the slope is d for a 
permanent change and approximately unity for a transitory change. Using our clean data and 
measures of cash flow, we obtain a slope estimate of 0.2303 for this regression with a one-tailed 
p-value of 0.0856. Although these results are not as strong as for our regression, they do not 
suggest that our results are driven by our specification. 
‘sAlthough it would be appropriate to test for the difference in coefficients for the announce- 
ment-window and control-window regressions, it is not clear what are the properties of the 
standard test statistics with the severe errors-in-variables problem discussed earlier. 
R. Israel et al.. Gush-flow rnformarion in equity-for-debt swaps 363 
Table 2 
Summary statistics for percentage changes in stock price and forecast net operating income 
surrounding equity-for-debt swaps in the period September 23, 1981 through June 27, 1984 
(r-statistics in parentheses). 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum IMaximum 
Panel A. Full sample: 182 obserL.ations 
Percentage change” 
in stock price 
(announcement window) 
Percentage change’ 
in stock price 
(control window) 
Percentage change in’ 
forecast NOI 
(short term) 
- 1.28% 3.46% - 8.94% 11.98% 
( - 4.99) 
0.11% 2.96% - 8.45% 9.22% 
(0.52) 
- 5.88% 19.46% - 100.00% 60.28% 
( - 4.07) 
Panel B. Clean sample: I25 obsercan’onsd.r 
Percentage change” 
in stock price - 1.57% 3.33% - 8.94% 
(announcement window) ( - 5.28) 
Percentage change’ 
in stock price 0.03% 2.88% - 6.88% 
(control window) (0.13) 
Percentage change inc 
forecast NOI - 3.88% 17.58% - 55.7570 
(short term) (- 2.47) 
Panel C. Clean sample (long-rerm forecasu): 80 obsen.arionsd.g 
Percentage change“ 
in stock price - 2.02% 3.05% - 8.43% 
(announcement window) ( - 5.92) 
Percentage change’ 
in stock price 0.22% 2.84% - 5.30% 
(control window) (0.70) 
Percentage change in’ 
forecast NOI 3.38% 9.99% - 13.04% 
(long term) (3.03) 
Panel D. Clean sample (obsercarions l-621: 62 obserLalionsd, e 
Percentage change” 
in stock price - 1.93% 3.10% - 8.94% 
(announcement window) (- 4.89) 
Percentage changeb 
in stock price -0.18% 2.71% - 6.88% 
(control window) C-0.51) 
Percentage change in’ 
forecast NOI - 7.06% 12.96% - 35.09% 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum 
Panel E. Clean sample (observations 63-125): 63 obserL,ationsd.’ 
Percentage changed 
in stock price - 1.23% 3.54% - 8.43% 
(announcement window) (- 2.76) 
Percentage changeb 
in stock price 0.24% 3.05% - 5.29% 
(control window) (0.63) 
Percentage change inc 
forecast NOI - 0.7J% 20.81% -X75% 





“Percentage change in stock price in a window starting two days before the swap announce- 
ment and ending one day after the announcement. 
bPercentage change in stock price in a window starting two days after the swap announcement 
and ending five days after the announcement. 
‘Percentage change in Value Line forecast of annual NOI for the first available fiscal year 
after the swap announcement. It is taken from the last forecast before the announcement 
through the first forecast after the announcement. Forecasts are reported quarterly. 
dThis sample excludes observations for which there is a confounding event in a seven-day 
window starting two days before the swap announcement and ending five days after the 
announcement. 
eThis sample includes all observations for which there was a short-term forecast available. 
‘Percentage change in Value Line forecast of average annual NOI for the third through the 
fifth fiscal year after the swap announcement. It is taken from the last forecast before the 
announcement through the first forecast after the announcement. Forecasts are reported 
quarterly. 
gThis sample includes all observations for which a long-term forecast is available. 
the hypothesis that forecasts of net operating income are not revised follow- 
ing swap announcements. Thus, analysts revise their forecasts of NOf after a 
swap announcement and these revisions are consistent with the observed 
change in equity values. This evidence supports the hypothesis that some 
portion of the price drop surrounding announcements of these swaps is 
caused by the release of bad news about the level of firm cash flows. 
An alternative explanation for our results is that analysts simply adjust 
their forecasts on the basis of movements in the stock price. Thus, the swap 
may convey no information, but the drop in stock price surrounding a swap 
may cause analysts to revise their forecasts downward. Our control regression 
makes this explanation look implausible. 
4.3. I. Regression diagnostics 
To validate our regression results, we run a number of diagnostic tests. 
First, we check for the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity. Table 3 
reports results for the White (1980) test, which allow us to accept the null 
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Table 3 
Ordinary-least-squares regressions testing for a positive relation between the relative change in 
stock price surrounding announcement of an equity-for-debt swap and the relative change in the 
forecast of net operating income surrounding the announcement. A positive relation is consis- 
tent with the hypothesis that announcements of equity-for-debt swaps convey information about 
expected cash flows. The entire sample consists of equity-for-debt swaps from September 23. 
1981 through June 27. 1984. 








Full samplec.“ - 0.0504 
Short-term forecast (0.0153) 
(n = 182) (0.0010) 
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Short-term forecast 
(n = 1251 
Full sample controld.’ 
Short-term forecast 
(n = 182) 
Clean sample controP.[ 
Short-term forecast 





























































0.05s 1 1.395 1 
(0.4978) 
“The first number in parentheses below the coefficient estimate is the standard error. The 
setond number in parentheses is the one-tailed p-value. 
Chi-square test to determine whether there is conditional heteroskedasticity. The number in 
parentheses below the statistic is the p-value. 
‘The dependent variable is the relative change in the Value Line forecast of annual NO1 for 
the first available fiscal year after the swap announcement. It is taken from the last forecast 
before the announcement through the first forecast after the announcement, with the forecasts 
reported quarterly. The independent variable is the relative change in the stock price for a 
three-day window starting two days before the announcement and ending one day after the 
announcement. 
dThis sample also includes observations for which there is a confounding event in a seven-day 
window starting two days before the swap announcement and ending five days after the 
announcement. 
“This sample excludes observations for which there is a confounding event in a seven-day 
window starting two days before the swap announcement and ending five days after the 
announcement. 
‘The dependent variable is the relative change in the Value Line forecast of annual 1VOI for 
the first available fiscal year after the swap announcement. It is taken from the last forecast 
before the announcement through the first forecast after the announcement, with the forecasts 
reported quarterly. The independent variable is the relative change in the stock price for a 
three-day window starting two days after the announcement and ending five days after the 
announcement. This regression tests for spurious correlation for regressions I and II. 
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‘The dependent variable is the relative change in the Value Line forecast of average annual 
NOI for the third through the fifth fiscal years after the swap announcement. It is taken from the 
last forecast before the announcement through the first forecast after the announcement. with 
the forecasts reported quarterly. The independent variable is the relative change in the stock 
price for a three-day window starting two days before the announcement and ending one day 
after the announcement. This regression tests whether the information conveyed by the swap is 
peimanent or transitory. 
Observations are ranked by date. Regressions VI and VII test whether analysts updated their 
expected levels of cash flows differently early and later in the sample period. Observations 1-62 
span the period from September 23, 1981 through September 10. 1982. Observations 63-124 
span the period from September 14, 1982 through June 27. 1981. 
hypothesis of conditional homoskedasticity of the error terms. Second, we 
check for the presence of cross-sectional correlation among the error terms. 
Although our regression is cross-sectional, our sample of swap announce- 
ments spans less than three years. Because the measured change in NOI 
forecasts around a given announcement spans at least three months, there 
will be temporal overlap of the error terms in (10) for observations whose 
announcement dates are within a few months of each other. If common 
economic events cause updates in forecasts of NOI, then this temporal 
overlap may cause cross-sectional correlation among the error terms. This 
would cause our standard errors to be understated and could reverse our 
finding of a significant j3. We therefore rank observations by swap-announce- 
ment dates and examine autocorrelations of the estimated residuals. This 
should provide a measure of the correlation of the errors of observations that 
are most likely to be correlated. We conclude that cross-sectional correlation 
of the error terms is not an important problem. Finally, we run a battery of 
diagnostics tests for influential observations, using the tests suggested by 
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980). These tests are not able to detect any 
influential observations for either the full sample of 182 or the clean sample 
of 125. 
4.3.2. Economic interpretation of coefficient estimates 
We can use our theoretical results to place broad restrictions on the value 
of the regression coefficient and thus test our specification. Eq. (9) shows that 
if changes in expected net operating income are permanent, /3 should equal 
one. If the changes are expected to be transitory, p should equal l/d. The 
value of l/d should be close to the price-earnings ratios of the firms. Thus, a 
value of p in the neighborhood of lo-30 would be expected. For the 
contaminated sample, the estimated value of p is close to one. Unfortu- 
nately, we cannot conclude that changes in expected levels of net operating 
income released by swaps are permanent. As discussed earlier, the point 
estimate of p is likely to be biased toward zero. In fact, it may be severely 
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biased. The downward bias arises from a standard errors-in-variables prob- 
lem due to mismeasurement of 4P/P and from the correlation between 
JP/P and I_L. If we concentrate on the pure errors-in-variables problem, and 
thus derive a conservative estimate of the bias, we know that 
slim Pols = (1 -YIP7 (13) 
where 
var(n,) 
‘= var(PR[dP/P]} ’ 
We can estimate y, as suggested by Israel, Ofer, and Siegel (1990), by 
taking the ratio of the variance of the relative change in stock price in the 
control window to the variance of the relative change in stock price in the 
announcement window, vat-( PR[ 4 P/P],)/var{ Pf?[4 P/P]}. This ratio equals 
0.732 and 0.824 for the full and clean samples. Thus the error-in-variables 
bias, l/(1 - y>, would be a factor 3.731 and 5.682 for the full and clean 
samples. Applying these adjustments to the parameter estimates (and assum- 
ing that the pure errors-in-variables bias is dominant) yields adjusted esti- 
mates of (0.6503) x (3.731) = 2.426 for the full sample and (1.0370) X (5.682) 
= 5.892 for the clean sample. Includin, 0 the bias due to the correlation 
between JP/P and ,u would increase these point estimates even more. Our 
point estimates do not violate the broad restrictions suggested by our theory 
and provide no evidence against our specification. They do not, however, 
provide reliable evidence about whether the information conveyed by swap 
announcements is about transitory or permanent changes in earnings. We 
discuss evidence on this issue in the next section. 
4.3.3. Transitory vs. permanent change in cash-flow expectations 
Because we use revisions in short-term forecasts in our regressions, we 
have already provided evidence consistent with the hypothesis that analysts 
update their expectations of nearby cash flows following a swap announce- 
ment. To test whether they also update their expectations of more distant 
cash flows, we repeat our tests using analysts’ forecasts of cash flows three to 
five years out.‘” 
In addition to publishing forecasts for the nearest (available) fiscal year, 
Value Line publishes average forecasts for the three-year period starting with 
the third fiscal year out. Regression V of table 3 is of the revision of this 
long-term forecast on the change in stock price surrounding the swap 
announcement, for the clean sample. ” The smaller sample size of 80 (instead 
“We thank the referee for suggesting this test. 
“Results for the sample including confounding events are similar. 
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of 125) reflects data availability. Panel C of table 2 presents summary 
statistics for the variables used in the regression. 
The insignificant regression coefficient on the change in stock price pro- 
vides no evidence that analysts update their long-term forecasts of cash flows 
following a swap announcement. Combined with our earlier positive findings 
for short-term forecasts, this indicates that swap announcements convey 
information about transitory, rather than permanent, changes in cash flow 
expectations. 
4.3.4. Subsample results 
’ One of the major differences between this paper and Lys and Sivara- 
makrishnan (1988) is that whereas we find a significant relation between 
changes in analysts’ forecasts of cash flows and stock-price changes around 
swap announcements, they find none. We have discussed earlier how our use 
of net operating income is more appropriate than their use of adjusted 
earnings per share. Another difference is that our sample period extends 
beyond theirs. A possible explanation for the divergence in results is that 
Value Line only began updating its forecasts of cash flows in the latter part 
of the sample period. Equity-for-debt swaps were a financial innovation, and 
it may have taken time for Value Line to realize the information content of 
the swaps.” 
Regressions VI and VII are for two subperiods. Regression VI uses the 
first 62 observations and regression VII the next 63 observations of the clean 
sample. ” Panels D and E of table 2 present summary statistics for the 
variables used in regressions VI and VII. We find no significant relation 
between revisions in forecasts and price changes for the first 62 swaps, but we 
do find a significant relation for the next 63 observations.” Theses results 
can be evidence of a learning process, in which Value Line took some time to 
discover that swaps convey information about cash flows. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we test whether announcements of equity-for-debt swaps 
convey information about the expected cash flows of the firm. If they do, we 
‘“We thank Tom Lys for suggesting this possibility. 
“We divide the sample in half for two reasons. First, the Lys and Sivaramakrishnan (1988) 
sample includes some swaps that we do not include. Second, we do not want to bias the power of 
the regressions by using different numbers of observations in each. Lys and Sivaramakrishnan’s 
sample extends from August 1981 through April 1983. Using this period, we do not find any 
significant results. 
“Although it would be appropriate to test for the difference in coefficients for regressions VI 
and VII, it is not clear what are the properties of the standard test statistics with the severe 
errors-in-variables problem discussed earlier. 
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should observe that analysts revise their expectations of firm cash flows 
following these announcements. Furthermore, if stock-price reactions to 
swap announcements capture the value of the information conveyed, these 
forecast revisions should be positively correlated with the stock-price reac- 
tions. We document a positive correlation between revisions in Value Line 
forecasts of net operating income and stock-price reactions to swap an- 
nouncements. Thus our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 
announcements of equity-for-debt swaps convey information about the ex- 
pected level of cash flows of the firm. We also present evidence consistent 
with the hypothesis that the information conveyed by the swap announce- 
ment is about transitory, not permanent, changes in expected cash flows. 
Finally, we provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that Value Line 
did not initially recognize the information content of swaps, but after observ- 
ing them over time started updating its cash-flow forecasts following swap 
announcements. 
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